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I. CHARLES J. COOPER
The topic of this panel-the nature of executive power as it
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relates to foreign affairs-is an extraordinarily timely one. The Presi-
dent and Congress are currently engaged in a number of disputes over
their respective powers in the field of foreign affairs. The use of
American naval vessels to escort reflagged merchant ships in the Per-
sian Gulf has once again raised questions concerning the War Powers
Act,' and the boundaries between the President's powers as Com-
mander-in-Chief and the Congress' power to declare war. In the
pending Department of State authorization bill,2 Congress has
asserted a right to use its appropriations power to micromanage the
foreign policy of the United States. Similarly, in the Department of
Defense authorization bill, 3 Congress again invoked the appropria-
tions power in an attempt to control the President's implementation
of a treaty to which the Senate consented fifteen years ago.4 Further-
more, the imminent publication of the Iran-Contra Committee's
report5 will remind us that our brief respite from that matter has been
all too temporary.
Clearly, the issue of presidential, as opposed to congressional,
power in the field of foreign affairs is very much with us. Today,
however, I propose not to discuss current events but to examine this
1. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
2. H.R. 1777, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). The bill was subsequently enacted, in
somewhat modified form, as the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 1988 and 1989, Pub. L.
No. 100-204, 101 Stat. 1331 (1987). For examples of this congressional micromanagement, see
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 123, 101
Stat. 1331, at 1341 (1987) (closing of consular and diplomatic posts in Antigua and Barbuda);
id., § 151, at 1351-52 (withdrawal from U.S.-U.S.S.R. embassy agreement); id., § 1003, at 1407
(prohibitions regarding the Palestine Liberation Organization); id., § 1234(b), at 1418-19 (U.S.
policy toward Iran-Iraq War). The act also contains numerous "sense of the Congress"
provisions that are purely hortatory and, therefore, constitutionally unobjectionable.
3. H.R. 1748, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). The House bill adopted most of the Senate
proposals contained in S. 1174. After the delivery of these remarks, Congress enacted the
House bill as the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L.
No. 100-180, 101 Stat. 1019 (1987).
4. The treaty in question is, of course, the "ABM" Treaty. Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States-USSR, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503
(entered into force Oct. 3, 1972). The Levin-Nunn amendment to S. 1174 sought to restrict
the Reagan Administration's so-called "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty by limiting
the expenditure of funds for the Strategic Defense Initiative to activities consistent with the
"narrow" interpretation. See 133 CONG. REC. S6355-6379 (daily ed. May 13, 1987); 133
CONG. REC. S6453-6473 (daily ed. May 14, 1987); 133 CONG. REC. S12,134-12,195 (daily ed.
Sept. 16, 1987); 133 CONG. REC. S12,235-12,243 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1987); see also National
Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-108, § 225, 101 Stat.
1019, 1056 (1987) (relevant provision of bill as enacted).
5. The Select Committees issued a joint report on the Iran-Contra affair in November,
1987. H.R. REP. No. 433, S. REP. No. 216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Chapter 25 of the
majority report, id. at 387-93, and chapters 2-4 of the minority report, id. at 457-79, set forth
opposing views of the extent of presidential power in the field of foreign affairs.
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issue from an originalist's perspective; that is, to examine the framers'
original understanding of the executive power as it relates to foreign
affairs.
Let us begin not with the framers themselves, but with their
teachers. John Locke's Two Treatises of Government6 was one of the
framers' primers on political science. Locke divided the power of
government into three parts: the Legislative, which prescribes the
internal or municipal laws of the society;7 the Executive, which
enforces the municipal laws;' and the Federative, which deals with
foreign states.9 What is particularly interesting about Locke's view is
that even though he ultimately believed in the supremacy of the Legis-
lature, his concept of executive power was quite broad. Locke's Exec-
utive was not a mere functionary, which carried out the Legislature's
wishes. Rather, the holder of executive power possessed the ability to
use the power for the benefit of society. Locke explained his broad
view of executive power as follows:
Many things there are which the law can by no means provide for,
and those must necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has
the executive power in his hands, to be ordered by him as the pub-
lic good and advantage shall require... [in some cases] it is fit that
the laws themselves should ... give way to the executive power
10
In short, by executive power Locke meant the "power to act accord-
ing to discretion for the public good, without the prescription of the
law and sometimes even against it."II
Locke believed that the executive power, notwithstanding its
breadth, was not the only power that should be given to the Execu-
tive. Although he viewed the executive and federative powers as dis-
tinct, he believed that "they are [not] to be separated and placed at the
same time in the hands of distinct persons."12 Locke defined the fed-
erative power as "the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances,
and all the transactions with all persons and all communities without
the commonwealth."' 3 Thus, Locke envisioned a system of govern-
6. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1960). For a
discussion of Locke's influence on the framers, see B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27-30 (1967).
7. J. LOCKE, supra note 6, at 382-84.
8. Id. at 382-84.
9. Id. at 382-84.
10. Id at 384-85.
11. Id. at 384-85.
12. Id. at 384.
13. Id. at 385.
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ment in which the Executive had broad discretionary powers, particu-
larly in foreign affairs.
The theories of Locke, and of Blackstone 4 and Montesquieu,
15
who also perceived the direction of foreign relations as within the
power of the Executive,' 6 did much to define what the framers under-
stood by executive power, but the way the framers felt about executive
power was shaped by their experiences. By the time that the Declara-
tion of Independence was signed, Americans who had long suffered
the oppression of King George III and his royal governors had grown
suspicious of executive power and placed their confidence in legisla-
tive assemblies. 7
The first state constitutions drafted after independence reflected
this distrust of executive power and, therefore, generally featured
strong Legislatures and very weak Executives.'" The Virginia Consti-
tution of 1776, for example, stated that the Chief Executive "shall
14. See W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765) (Univ.
Chicago facsimile ed. 1979).
15. See C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (1762) (J. Prichard rev. ed 1912).
16. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 462 n. 1 (5th rev. ed 1984).
17. See J. GREENE, THE QUEST FOR POWER: THE LOWER HOUSES OF ASSEMBLY IN THE
SOUTHERN ROYAL COLONIES, 1689-1776 (1963). Professor Greene argues that much of the
struggle between the colonies and Great Britain took place in the context of political contests
between appointed royal governors and locally elected assemblies. Thus Americans quite
naturally viewed legislatures positively and executives negatively. When independence
afforded them the opportunity to construct their own political arrangements, they reacted
accordingly.
The evolution of American opinion in regard to executive power is illustrated by the
colonists' shifting attitude toward the British crown. As late as 1760, Americans had cheered
the accession of George III to the throne. Benjamin Franklin predicted that under George
III's rule "faction will dissolve and be dissipated like a morning fog before the rising sun."
Letter from Benjamin Franklin to William Strahan (December 19, 1763), reprinted in 10 THE
PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 406, 407 (L. Labaree ed. 1966). John Adams noted in his
diary, after reading George III's first speech to Parliament, that "these are sentiments worthy
of a king-a patriot king." Diary of John Adams, 1761, reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS (C. Adams ed. 1850) (exact date unknown; entry between dates of February 9 and
March 3, 1761).
The subsequent colonial crisis that resulted in independence profoundly affected
American notions of the desirability of a strong Executive. By 1776, Americans had come to
view the King in a somewhat different light. No longer the "rising sun" dissipating the fog,
George III was now "the royal brute of Great Britain," descended from a "French bastard"
who had conquered England with "an armed banditti." Abigail Adams wrote to her husband
John that "we have in George a match for a Borgia or a Cataline, a wretch callous to every
humane feeling." R. KETCHAM, PRESIDENTS ABOVE PARTY: THE FIRST AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY, 1789-1829, at 69-73 (1984).
18. See W. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS (1980); F. GREEN,
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC STATES, 1776-1860, at 89-91
(1966 ed.); J. MAIN, THE SOVEREIGN STATES, 1775-1783, at 143-44 (1973); A. NEVINS, THE
AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION, 1775-1789, at 164-170 (1924);
C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775-1789, at 25-54 (1923).
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with the advice of a Council of State, exercise the executive powers of
government according to the laws of this commonwealth; and shall
not, under any pretence, exercise any power or prerogative by virtue
of any law, statute, or custom, of England."19 Jefferson, who served
as Governor of Virginia during the Revolution, complained that all
powers of the government "result to the legislative body," and that its
direction of the Executive had become "habitual and familiar. '20
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 provided for a virtu-
ally omnipotent, unicameral legislature, and a correspondingly impo-
tent executive council.21 Indeed, the council complained in a message
to the legislature:
[I]t has been one of the greatest objections made to this Constitu-
tion, that it has left too little power in the executive branch; and
yet we see daily attempts to make that little less. We cannot sup-
pose that it is intended practically to show the people what mis-
chief and abuse a single legislature may do, and yet we are at a loss
otherwise to account for those proceedings which are particularly
the objects of this message.22
To be sure, a few states resisted this trend. The New York Con-
stitution of 1777,23 and the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780,24
both provided for strong Executives, but these were distinct excep-
tions. James Madison lamented during the Philadelphia Convention
that:
Experience proved a tendency in our governments to throw all
power into the Legislative vortex. The Executives of the States are
in general little more than Cyphers; the legislatures omnipotent. If
no effectual check be devised for restraining the instability and
encroachments of the latter, a revolution of some kind or other
would be inevitable.25
If one turns from the states to the national government under the
19. VA. CONST. OF 1776, ch. II, art. IX.
20. T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 113-14 (T. Abernethy ed. 1964).
21. PA. CONST. OF 1776, ch. II, §§ 1-3. See R. BRUNHOUSE, THE COUNTER-
REVOLUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1790 (1942). See generally J. SELSAM, THE
PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776 (1936). Pennsylvanians, like other Americans, came
to appreciate the necessity of executive power and, just a year after the adoption of the
Constitution of the United States, replaced their 1776 constitution with a more balanced
system.
22. Quoted in C. THACH, supra note 18, at 32-33.
23. NEW YORK CONST. OF 1777, arts. XVII-XIX.
24. MASS. CONST. OF 1780, part II, c. II, § 1, art. VII. See generally 0. & M. Handlin,
Introduction, THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY (0. & M. Handlin eds.
1966).
25. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 35 (M. Farrand rev.
ed. 1937) [hereinafter M. FARRAND].
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Articles of Confederation, the situation was even worse. The Articles
of Confederation established no executive authority at all.26 Through-
out the Revolution, executive power was exercised by the Congress
through a series of ad hoc committees and boards.27 Such an arrange-
ment was hardly conducive to conducting a war and led General
Washington to complain-with magnificent understatement-that
"there is a vital and inherent principle of delay incompatible with
Military service in transacting Business, through such various and dif-
ferent channels."2 As Alexander Hamilton noted, "the want of an
executive" was one of the primary deficiencies of the Articles of Con-
federation. 29 Hamilton wrote:
Congress have [sic] kept the power too much in their own hands
and has meddled too much with details of every sort. Congress is
properly a deliberative corps and it forgets itself when it attempts
to play the Executive. It is impossible that such a body, numerous
as it is, constantly fluctuating, can ever act with sufficient decision
or with system.30
By the time that the Constitutional Convention met in Philadel-
phia in 1787, the pendulum of opinion had begun to swing in favor of
a strong Executive.3" Gouveneur Morris explained that political theo-
rists believed:
Republican Government is not adapted to a large extent of the
Country, because the energy of the Executive Magistracy can not
reach the extreme parts of it. Our Country is an extensive one.
We must either renounce the blessing of the Union, or provide an
Executive with sufficient vigor to pervade every part of it.
32
Needless to say, Morris favored the latter alternative. Far from fear-
ing the concentration of power in the Executive, Morris argued that
he would be "the great protector of the Mass of the people against
legislative tyranny. '33
26. C. THACH, supra note 18, at 55-75. See generally M. JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION (1940); M. JENSEN, THE NEW NATION (1950).
27. -C. THACH, supra note 18, at 55-69.
28. Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress (July 10, 1775), reprinted
in 3 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 320, 324 (Fitzpatrick ed. 1931). The situation
Washington complained of improved dramatically when Congress appointed Joseph Trumbull
as Commissary-General, but Trumbull later resigned because of a departmental reorganization
that eliminated his power to remove key subordinates and placed it in Congress. When the
supply system then returned to its pre-Trumbull state of inefficiency, Congress relented and
restored the Commissary-General's power of removal. C. THACH, supra note 18, at 65-67.
29. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Duane (September 3, 1780), reprinted in 2
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 400, 404 (H. Syrett ed. 1961).
30. Id. at 404.
31. C. THACH, supra note 18, at 76.
32. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 25, at 52.
33. Id.
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The new Constitution created a unitary Executive, unburdened
by an executive council. The President was to be elected by an electo-
ral college selected by the people34 and was neither responsible to, nor
removable by, the legislative branch, except insofar as he should be
guilty of an impeachable offense. 35 The President was given broad
powers of appointment,36 the power to receive foreign ambassadors, 3
the preeminent role in making treaties,38 command of the military,39
and a qualified veto over legislative action." In short, the Executive
that emerged from the Philadelphia convention was an independent
repository of government power, subject to "checks and balances,"41
but possessed of full dignity and authority in his own right.
The extent of the President's power over foreign affairs was soon
put to the test. England and France declared war on each other in
1793. This presented an immediate problem for the United States
because of our treaty obligations to France under the 1778 Treaty of
Amity and Commerce42 and the Treaty of Alliance.4 3 The free colo-
nies had entered into these treaties with the King of France prior to
the French Revolution, and there was some question as to whether
they continued in force under the new revolutionary government." A
further question arose as to whether it was for the President or the
Congress to make that determination. After consulting with his cabi-
net, President Washington decided, on his own authority and without
Congressional approval, to issue a proclamation of neutrality.45
34. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cls. 2-3.
35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
36. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cls. 2-3.
37. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
38. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
39. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3.
41. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 2 (congressional override of presidential veto); U.S.
CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Senate's advice and consent to appointments and treaties); U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 4 (removal of President by impeachment and conviction by Senate).
42. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, February 6, 1778, United States-France, 8 Stat. 12,
18(2) Stat. 203, Act Separate and Secret, 17 Stat. 795, 18(2) Stat. 213, T.S. No. 83, annulled by
ch. 67, 1 Stat. 578 (1798).
43. Treaty of Alliance, February 6, 1778, United States-France, 4 Stat. 6, 18(2) Stat. 201,
T.S. No. 82, annulled by ch. 67, 1 Stat. 578 (1798). For the best texts of these treaties,
including both the English and the original French versions, as well as a useful introductory
essay, see THE TREATIES OF 1778 AND ALLIED DOCUMENTS (G. Chinard ed. 1928).
44. See Pacificus No. II, Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia) July 3, 1793, in 15 H.
SYRETr, infra note 46, at 55-63 (arguing that the treaties were defensive alliances and that the
United States was not obligated to honor them because in the Anglo-French conflict France
was the aggressor). See generally A. DECONDE, ENTANGLING ALLIANCE: POLITICS AND
DIPLOMACY UNDER WASHINGTON (1958) (general discussion of the politics and tensions of
the period).
45. Proclamation of Neutrality, No. 65, ASP, Foreign Relations , 140, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
19881
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Washington was supported by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander
Hamilton, who defended the constitutionality of the proclamation in a
series of essays published under the pseudonym "Pacificus."
'
Hamilton's principal argument was based on the twin conclu-
sions that the proclamation was properly understood as an executive
act, and that all the executive authority of the federal government
belonged to the President.47 Although Hamilton's first proposition is
debatable, the second is seemingly indisputable, given the clear
language of the first sentence of article II, section 1, of the
Constitution.48
Having first concluded that issuing the neutrality proclamation
was an executive act,49 Hamilton then noted that article II conferred
the "Executive Power" on the President.5" This grant of the entire
executive power, Hamilton argued, was in sharp contrast to the word-
ing of article I, section 1, which states "all legislative powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States. ' 51 In other
words, the President was granted all executive powers, while the Con-
gress was granted only those legislative powers specifically enumer-
ated. Hamilton argued that the recitation of specific presidential
powers in article II was merely illustrative of the "Executive power,"
rather than an exhaustive catalog of its limits.52
Hamilton acknowledged that the executive power was not unlim-
ited.53 For example, the Senate's right of advice and consent limited
the treaty power and5 4 the appointment of ambassadors." In addi-
tion, the Commander-in-Chief power was limited by the Congress'
(1793), reprinted in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 430-31 (J. Fitzpatrick ed.
1939) [hereinafter J. FITZPATRICK]. The standard source on this episode is C. THOMAS,
AMERICAN NEUTRALITY IN 1793 (1931). See A. DECONDE, supra note 43; F. GILBERT, To
THE FAREWELL ADDRESS: EARLY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1961); P. VARG, FOREIGN
POLICIES OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1963).
46. Hamilton's Pacificus essays were originally published in the Gazette of the United
States (Philadelphia) June 29-July 20, 1793. They are reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33-43, 55-63, 65-69, 82-86, 90-95, 100-06, 130-35 (H. Syrett ed.
1969) [hereinafter H. SYRETT].
47. Pacificus No. I, Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia) June 29, 1793, in 15 H.
SYRETT, supra note 46, at 33-43.
48. "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
49. 15 H. SYRETr, supra note 46, at 37-38.
50. Id. at 38.
51. Id. at 39-40.
52. Id. at 39.
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power to declare war. 6 But he argued:
As the participation of the [S]enate in the making of Treaties and
the power of the Legislature to declare war are exceptions out of
the general 'Executive Power' vested in the President, they are to
be construed strictly, and ought to be extended no further than is
essential to their execution.57
Because neither of those two powers, strictly construed, was impli-
cated by the proclamation of neutrality, its issuance was within the
executive power of the President.
58
Although Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson favored a policy of
neutrality, he believed that unilateral action of this kind by the Presi-
dent was unconstitutional.5 9 Jefferson maintained that "a declaration
of neutrality was a declaration [that] there should be no war, to which
the executive was not competent."'  Jefferson was particularly exer-
cised by Hamilton's Pacificus essays, and he urged his friend and col-
league, James Madison, to prepare a response.61 Jefferson wrote:
"For God's sake, my dear Sir, take up your pen, select the most strik-
ing heresies and cut him to pieces in the face of the public. There is
nobody else who can and will enter the lists with him."'6
2
Although reluctant, Madison complied with Jefferson's request
and prepared a series of essays published under the pseudonym
"Helvidius. '63 In his essays, Madison denounced Hamilton's notion
of executive power as having been inspired by the royal prerogatives
of the British government and, therefore, to be "condemned as no less
vicious in theory than it would be dangerous in practice." 6 Madison
concluded that the power to declare neutrality was a legislative power




59. D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY 55-163 (1962); M.
PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION 479-517 (1970). In addition to his
constitutional scruples, Jefferson opposed a gratuitous American declaration of neutrality,
preferring instead to exact some consideration, in the form of trade concessions, from the
belligerents. D. MALONE, supra, at 70; M. PETERSON supra, at 484-85.
60. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (June 23, 1793), reprinted in 15 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 37 (T. Mason, R. Rutland, J. Session eds. 1985) [hereinafter T.
MASON].
61. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 7, 1793), reprinted in 15 T.
MASON, supra note 60, at 43.
62. Id.
63. Madison's five Helvidius essays were originally published in Gazette of the United
States (Philadelphia) August 24-September 18, 1793. They are reprinted in 15 T. MASON,
supra note 60, at 64-120.
64. Helvidius No. I, Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia) August 24, 1793, in 15 T.
MASON, supra note 60, at 72.
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President.65
We do not know why Madison was so reluctant to respond to
Hamilton's Pacificus essays, but it may well have been because Hamil-
ton's views of executive power mirrored views previously expressed by
both Jefferson and Madison. In arguing that the executive power of
article II, section 1, was an independent grant of presidential author-
ity above and beyond the specific powers listed in section 2, Hamilton
reiterated an argument that Madison had used in a debate over the
President's removal power during the first Congress." And Jefferson,
in an opinion to President Washington in April, 1790, wrote:
[The Constitution] has declared that the executive power shall be
vested in the President, submitting only special articles of it to a
negative by the Senate .... The transaction of business with for-
eign nations is executive altogether. It belongs then to the head of
that department, except as to such portions of it as are specifically
submitted to the Senate. Exceptions are to be construed strictly.67
Jefferson's view, at least at that time, was very similar to Hamilton's.
A critical component of the President's executive power that is of
obvious importance in the field of foreign affairs is his authority as
Commander-in-Chief. 61 Modem theorists are reluctant to give that
power the scope that its wording seems necessarily to imply, which
prompts one to wish that the framers had further elaborated on the
65. Madison argued:
A declaration that there shall be war, is not an execution of laws; it does not
suppose pre-existing laws to be executed; it is not in any respect, an act merely
executive. It is, on the contrary, one of the most deliberative acts that can be
performed; and when performed, has the effect of repealing all the laws operating
in a state of peace, so far as they are inconsistent with a state of war; and of
enacting as a rule for the executive, a new code adapted to the relation between
the society and its foreign enemy. In like manner a conclusion annuls all the laws
peculiar to a state of war, and revives the general laws incident to a state of peace.
Helvidius No. I, Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia) August 24, 1793, in 15 T. MASON,
supra note 60, at 69 (emphasis in original).
Madison, however, seemed to waffle on the question of which branch, in fact, had the
power to make such determinations and concluded:
[It] is plainly neither the one nor the other [Legislative or Executive]. It relates
neither to the execution of the subsisting laws, nor to the enaction of new ones,
and still less to an exertion of the common strength .... The power in question
seems therefore to form a distinct department, and to belong neither to the legis-
lative nor to the executive.
Id. at 73.
66. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 28-30 (1917).
67. Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic Appointments (April 24,
1790), in 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 378-379 (J. Boyd ed. 1961).
68. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. For a historical analysis of the commander-in-chief
power, see C. ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF (R.
Longaker rev. ed. 1976).
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commander-in-chief power in the Constitution. The authors of the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 apparently foresaw these modem
theorists because they elaborated considerably. Article VII of the
Massachusetts Constitution provided:
The governor of this Commonwealth, for the time being, shall be
the commander-in-chief of the army and navy and of all the mili-
tary forces of the State, by sea and land; and shall have full power,
by himself, or by any commander, or other officer or officers, from
time to time, to train, instruct, exercise and govern the militia and
navy; and for the special defence and safety of the Commonwealth,
to assemble in martial array, and put in warlike posture the
inhabitants thereof, and to lead and conduct them, and with them,
to encounter, repel, resist, expel[,] pursue, by force of arms, as well
by sea as by land, within or without the limits of this Common-
wealth, and also to kill, slay and destroy, if necessary, and conquer,
by all fitting ways, enterprises and means whatsoever, all and every
such person and persons as shall, at any time hereafter, in a hostile
manner, attempt or enterprise the destruction, invasion, detriment
or annoyance of the Commonwealth; ... and to take and surprise,
by all ways and means whatsoever, all and every such person or
persons, with their ships, arms, ammunition and other goods, as
shall, in a hostile manner, invade or attempt the invading, conquer-
ing or annoying this Commonwealth; and that the governor be
intrusted with all these and other powers incident to the offices of
captain-general and commander-in-chief, and admiral to be exer-
cised agreeably to the rules and regulations of the constitution, and
the laws of the land, and not otherwise.69
In simpler terms, the Governor, as Commander-in-Chief, was author-
ized to use military force to protect and defend the Commonwealth.
Presidents have generally interpreted their power as Com-
mander-in-Chief in the same manner. President Jefferson's actions
against the Barbary pirates provides an entertaining illustration of this
point. I might add that any resemblance between this episode and
current events in the Persian Gulf is entirely intentional.
During the late 18th and early 19th century, piracy was the
major economic activity of four Barbary states: Algeria, Morocco,
Tripoli, and Tunis.70 Merchant ships sailing the Mediterranean were
often attacked by pirates, who would not only steal their cargoes, but
69. MASS. CONST. OF 1780, part II, c. II, § 1, art. VII, annulled and replaced by art. 45 of
the Amendments (1918).
70. Jefferson's efforts against the Barbary pirates are surveyed in M. SMELSER, THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, 1801-1815, at 57-61 (1968). A discussion of the Dale mission
appears in 1 THE GROWTH OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 369-74, 376-78 (W. Goldsmith ed.
1974) [hereinafter W. GOLDSMITH].
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would also kidnap the crew for ransom. In addition to these income-
producing activities, .the Barbary states also extorted bribes to refrain
from conducting these illegitimate pursuits.
In May, 1801, Tripoli declared war on the United States. Tripoli
was upset that the United States had recently paid lavish bribes to the
Dey of Algiers, but not to them. Fortunately, however, President Jef-
ferson received advance warning of Tripoli's intentions. Even before
word of the declaration of war had arrived in Washington, the Secre-
tary of the Navy dispatched a squadron of four vessels under the com-
mand of Commodore Richard Dale to the Mediterranean on an
"observation cruise. '71
Dale's orders were to sail into the Mediterranean and inform the
Barbary states that the attitude of the American government was
friendly, but that the United States intended to protect American
commerce from attack.72 Dale was also instructed that if he should
find that any, or all, of the Barbary states had declared war on
America, he was to "chastise their insolence-by sinking, burning, or
destroying their ships wherever you shall find them."
73
Commodore Dale ordered the four ships to fly only the English
flag while at sea, until such time as there was "a necessity for the
contrary."74 That necessity occurred when one of the ships in the
squadron, the schooner Enterprise, encountered a Tripolitan cruiser in
the Mediterranean. The pirate commander was completely fooled by
the English flag and somewhat indiscreetly confided to the American
captain that he was in search of American merchant ships. Upon
hearing that, Enterprise lowered the English flag and raised the Amer-
ican flag-an early 19th century version of "reflagging." The Ameri-
cans then opened fire and severely damaged the pirate ship, which
eventually surrendered after more than half of her crew were either
71. Letter from General Samuel Smith to Commodore Richard Dale (May 20, 1801), No.
165, ASP, Foreign Relations 1, 359, 7th Cong., 1st Sess. (1801), quoted in I W. GOLDSMITH,
supra note 70, at 373.
72. Letter from General Samuel Smith to Commodore Richard Dale (May 20, 1801), No.
165, ASP, Foreign Relations I 359, 7th Cong., 1st Sess. (1801), reprinted in part in I W.
GOLDSMITH, supra note 70, at 374.
73. Letter from General Samuel Smith to Commodore Richard Dale (May 20, 1801), No.
165, ASP, Foreign Relations IL 359, 7th Cong., 1st Sess. (1801), reprinted in part in 1 W.
GOLDSMITH, supra note 70, at 375-76.
74. 1 W. GOLDSMITH, supra note 70, at 376. In his orders to Commodore Dale, General
Smith had suggested that "(B]y disguising your ships, it will be some weeks before they [the
Tripolitans and other North African states] will know that the squadron is cruising in the
Mediterranean, and give you a fair chance of punishing them." Letter from General Samuel
Smith to Commodore Richard Dale (May 20, 1801), No. 165, ASP, Foreign Relations IA 359,
7th Cong., 1st Sess. (1801).
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killed or injured. The Americans suffered no serious casualties.75
The significant point about this episode is that President Jeffer-
son, pursuant to his article II powers and without consulting, much
less obtaining the approval of, Congress, sent American military
forces half way around the world with explicit orders to engage in
hostilities if necessary. Not only did Jefferson take this initiative on
his own authority, he did not even inform Congress of the episode
until six month later.76
This necessarily brief survey establishes several points that I
think are important for determining the original understanding of
presidential power in the foreign affairs field. First, the founding gen-
eration understood executive power as conferring a broad authority
that extended beyond the mere execution of the laws. Second, the
unhappy experience with weak Executives in the states and in the
national government during the Revolution and the Confederation led
the Philadelphia Convention to establish a strong, unitary Executive
under the new Constitution. Finally, the understanding of article II
displayed by Washington, Madison, Hamilton, and Jefferson indicates
that the conduct of foreign relations is an aspect of the executive
power entrusted to the President, subject only to narrowly defined
exceptions. I submit, therefore, that the way that Presidents have his-
torically handled foreign affairs is in accord with the way that the
framers intended for them to act.
II. MICHAEL TIGAR
A. Introduction
Nearly twenty years ago, I wrote an article entitled Judicial
Power, the "Political Question Doctrine, " and Foreign Relations.77 I
wrote in the shadow of significant military activity in Vietnam, and
the incursion into Cambodia. I asked what, if any, role the Constitu-
tion required, or permitted, the federal judiciary to play in finding,
declaring, and enforcing the rules of domestic and international law
75. 1 W. GOLDSMITH, supra note 70, at 376-77. Commodore Dale described the
circumstances in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy written shortly after their occurrence,
and enclosed a copy of the action report of Enterprise's commanding officer, Lieutenant
Andrew Sterrett. See Letter of Commodore Dale to the Secretary of the Navy (Malta Harbor,
August 18, 1801), including Copy of Letter from Lieutenant Andrew Sterrett to Commodore
Richard Dale, dated on board the United States' schooner Enterprise (At Sea, August 6, 1801),
No. 165, ASP, Foreign Relations II, 360, 7th Cong., 1st Sess. (1801).
76. Jefferson informed Congress of the Dale mission in his First Annual Message to
Congress, December 8, 1801. See 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 11 (J. Gales ed. 1801), reprinted in 1
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 314 (J. Richardson rev. ed. 1908).
77. Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine," and Foreign Relations, 17
UCLA L. REv. 1135 (1970).
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that limit military action by the executive branch.7" Today we live in
the shadow of other conflicts. Therefore, we must once again measure
the roles of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in the
areas of foreign and military affairs.
In the years following the publication of my article, Presidents
representing both of our nation's political parties have claimed the
unreviewable power-a power that the Constitution seems to forbid-
to take action, and then have justified that action by invoking a
vaguely defined concern for national security and a theory that the
Court ought to keep its hands off. For example, President Nixon
sought to justify warrantless domestic electronic surveillance.79 Presi-
dent Carter made a more extensive claim in the context of alleged
espionage.80 The Reagan administration has taken the argument sev-
eral steps further, claiming a broad immunity from both congressional
and judicial scrutiny of its actions.
8 1
There are three questions that I want to address: First, what role
does the Constitution assign to the judiciary in the conduct of foreign
and military affairs? Second, what are the sources of law that the judi-
ciary might apply in its sphere of competence? Third, what are the
implications of these conclusions in today's international situation?
The basic theme of my 1970 article was that the political question
doctrine is all too often a judicial code word for avoiding a judicial
duty to protect litigants from unlawful exercises of executive power.
82
Unfortunately, all too often that definition holds true today.
78. Id. at 1147-52, 1167-78. See Henkin, Is There a "Political Questions" Doctrine?, 85
YALE L.J. 597 (1976) (concluding political question doctrine is "deceptive packaging").
79. United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
(Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 303, 320-21 (1972) (18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) does not confer power on
President to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance based on national security grounds,
and the Fourth Amendment requires prior judicial approval for Executive to conduct domestic
security surveillance.).
80. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980), appeal after
remand, 667 F.2d 1105 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982). The Fourth Circuit
held that the "foreign intelligence" exception to the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless
electronic surveillance so long as (1) the object of the surveillance is a foreign power, its agent,
or collaborators, and (2) the surveillance is primarily for foreign intelligence reasons. When
the investigation becomes criminal, however, a warrant is then required. Id. at 915-16.
81. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Finzer v. Barry,
798 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom., Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct.
1157 (1987); Von Avlock v. Smith, 720 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1983). As to the objections to
Congressional scrutiny, see United States v. Lavelle, 751 F.2d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See also
Kennedy, Treaty Interpretation by the Executive Branch: The ABM Treaty and "Star Wars"
Testing and Development, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 854-77 (1986); Turner, The War Powers
Resolution: Unconstitutional, Unnecessary, and Unhelpful, 17 Loy. L. REv. 683, 711-12
(1984).
82. Tigar, supra note 77, at 1165-67.
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B. The Constitution, Foreign Affairs, and the Judiciary
In Marbury v. Madison,83 Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged
that some executive acts are beyond judicial review. 4 Since that dic-
tum was pronounced, Presidents and judges have tusseled about its
meaning. In United States v. Burr,"5 however, Chief Justice Marshall
made it clear that the President was not immune from the judicial
process.8 6 Marshall's opinion in Burr formed the cornerstone of Dean
Wigmore's treatment of executive privilege,87 and is an implicit term
in arguments about the role of the rule of law in matters of state.
Harry Truman thought that he could seize the steel industry and
run it during the Korean conflict because he was the President, there
was shooting in Asia, and the steel industry was threatened with a
shutdown. 8 The Supreme Court, however, had no trouble spelling
out some truths about constitutional governance. First, Presidents
must obey the law.89 Second, in our society, the laws are not silent,
83. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
84. Id. at 165-66.
85. 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.W.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d) (cited with approval in United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).
86. Id. at 34.
87. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2369-79 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961 & Supp. 1987).
88. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
89. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Black delineated the President's role in the "law
life" of our Nation with succinctness. He stated:
The President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself. . . . In the framework of our
Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed
refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions
in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the
vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor
equivocal about who shall make the laws which the President is to execute....
The President's order does not direct that a congressional policy be executed in a
manner prescribed by Congress-it directs that a presidential policy be executed
in a manner prescribed by the President .... The Constitution does not subject
this lawmaking power of Congress to presidential or military supervision or
control.
Id. at 585-88. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, at least on this point, phrased it somewhat more
bluntly:
'The duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not
go beyond the laws or require him to achieve more than Congress see fit to leave
within his power.' The powers of the President are not as particularized as are
those of Congress. But unenumerated powers do not mean undefined powers.
The separation of powers built into our Constitution give essential content to
undefined provisions in the frame of our government.
Id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Mr. Justice Holmes in Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926)).
Mr. Justice Clark, in his concurrence, concluded that:
[Where Congress has laid down specific procedures to deal with the type of crisis
confronting the President, he must follow those procedures in meeting the crisis;
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even in times of war.9" Third, the judiciary has the power to declare
the law, regardless of who the parties are, when a real case or contro-
versy requires such a declaration in order to decide who wins and who
loses.91 Recently, a majority of the District of Columbia Circuit, sit-
ting en bane, echoed these principles when an American citizen sued
the Secretary of Defense because the United States Government had
taken over his land in Honduras to help mount covert military opera-
tions in Central America.
92
These cases reflect a proper judicial attitude towards executive
claims of unreviewable power to conduct foreign and military policy.
After all, some who opposed the adoption of the Constitution did so
because the executive branch appeared to possess too much unfettered
power. In the Virginia debate, Patrick Henry wondered whether a
lawless President would really obey the Supreme Court, or whether
he would use his power as Commander-in-Chief to defy it.93 Simi-
larly, many people may recall that Abraham Lincoln, as a Congress-
but that in the absence of such action by Congress, the President's independent
power to act depends upon the gravity of the situation confronting the nation.
Id. at 662.
Mr. Justice Burton also concurred based upon the President's failure to follow the con-
gressionally prescribed procedures. Id. at 660. Mr. Justice Jackson's three bases of presiden-
tial authority are discussed infra in text accompanying note 193.
90. Mr. Justice Black phrased the second truth as follows:
The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President's military
power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.... Even though 'theater of
war' be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional
system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate
power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor
disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not
for its military authorities.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587.
91. Id. at 583-84. Mr. Justice Frankfurter was more explicit on this point:
To deny inquiry into the President's power in a case like this, because of the
damage to the public interest to be feared from upsetting its exercise by him
would in effect always preclude inquiry into challenged power, which presumably
only avowed great public interest brings into action.
Id. at 596.
92. Ramirez de Arrellano v. Weinberger, 724 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd and
remanded, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (The destruction of a United States
citizen's Honduran cattle ranch by construction of United States military base presented
justiciable case, and the act of state doctrine did not bar judicial relief.), vacated and remanded
for reconsideration, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985) (mem.) (vacated and remanded in light of enactment
of Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1884, 1893-1894, which provided compensation for Americans
in Honduras whose property was taken by United States government action).
93. 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 59 (3d ed. 1941) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]
(remarks by Mr. Henry at the Virginia ratification convention, June 5, 1788), quoted in Tigar,
supra note 77, at 1172.
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man from Illinois, inveighed against the idea that the President could
make himself like a king, "involving and improvising" the people in
war.94 Patrick Henry's concern, whether one agrees with it or not,
expresses a contemporaneous understanding that the original purpose
of the judicial branch was to ensure that the laws were faithfully
executed.
Of course, Congress was also empowered to restrain foreign mili-
tary activity through the control of appropriations,95 declaration of
war,96 and grant of letters of marque and reprisal. 97 In addition, the
Senate's power of concurrence in treaties98 gave it a role in shaping
foreign policy, although sadly, some are arguing that the Senate can
consent to a treaty without understanding what the executive branch
thinks the treaty means.99 Although the President may embark upon
a course of foreign policy, or step down the road of foreign military
adventure, however, the judiciary will presumptively have power to
fashion some remedy when that conduct infringes upon a private
right.
The opposition to this view, as expressed by the dissenters in
Arellano, °° is based on both factual and legal solecisms. Arellano did
not involve a presidential decision to respond to a sudden attack, so
the hypotheticals conjured out of such imaginings by the dissenters
exult drama over common sense. The dissenters went on to question
why non-elected judges should be telling an elected President that he
was trampling private rights in his march towards a military objec-
tive. 01 The answer is plain in the Constitution's text, and in the "law
life" of the nation. The text recognizes that war is so calamitous an
event, for both public and private interests, that the President, alone,
is not supposed to propel us into one. Justice Story said as much in
his Commentaries on the Constitution.1 2 Our national experience
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 12.
95. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
96. Id.
97. Goldman, The President, the People and the Power to Make War, 21 AMERICAN
HERITAGE, April, 1970, at 28, reprinted in 3 R. FALK, THE VIETNAM WAR AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 489 (1972).
98. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
99. For a discussion of this dangerous "constitution busting" tactic, see Glennon,
Interpreting "Interpretation" The President, the Senate, and When Treaty Interpretation
Becomes Treaty Making, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 913 (1987).
100. 745 F.2d at 1545-74.
101. Id. at 1546-49 (Tamm, J., dissenting); id. at 1561-62 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §§ 1166, 1171, at 95-97 (3d ed.
1858); see also THE FEDERALIST Nos. 24-26 (A. Hamilton) (G. Carey & W. Kendall ed.
1966); Comment, Congress, the President, and. the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81
HARV. L. REv. 1771 (1968); Comment, The President the Congress, and the Power to Declare
War, 16 U. KAN. L. REv. 82 (1967).
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demonstrates that the rush towards improvident armed conflict is
often associated with jingoistic rhetoric, systematic assaults on the
right of dissent, and a public atmosphere of intolerance. 103 Non-
elected judges are supposed to restrain such things in the service of
the countermajoritarian values built into the Constitution by the
framers. 104
C. The Sources of Law
What do I mean by "law" in this context? Article VI of the Con-
stitution makes supreme the "Constitution," "laws" and "treaties" of
the United States..105 I am sorry to have to say something that sounds
tautological, but the point appears to have been lost in recent days:
Military activity in violation of "laws" of the United States is
unlawful.
I am not talking solely about the so-called Boland amendment,"°
but also about the network of laws that limit the use of United States
funds, territory, and personnel to conduct hostile actions against
countries with whom we are at peace. 0 7 Nothing in the text, history,
or authoritative interpretation of the Constitution gives the President
a shred of justification for violating, or purporting to authorize viola-
tion of, such laws. To argue the contrary is to sunder the most basic
understanding upon which the Constitution was ratified: namely,
that the states party to this compact were not installing as head of
state a king by some other name.'08 Certainly, then, these parties did
not intend to create a "king" free to disregard the law. As Lord Coke
explained in Dr. Bonham's Case, '09 the law stands indifferent between
sovereign and citizen and binds them both. 110 Military activity under-
103. See generally 1 T. EMERSON & D. HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 254-338 (2d ed. 1958).
104. For a more extended discussion of this question, and a detailed response to such
authors as Alexander Bickel, who rather derided the idea of a countermajoritarian institution
asserting itself in this way, see Tigar, supra note 77, at 1136.
105. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
106. The Boland amendment provisions have appeared in various statutes. See, e.g.,
Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 1983, Pub. L. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat. 1830, 1865
(1982). The Congressional Research Service compiled a legislative history and summary of the
"Boland amendments" through the summer of 1987, and the report was subsequently
published in the Congressional Record. See 133 CONG. REC. H4585-4987 (daily ed. June 15,
1987); see also H.R. REP. No. 433, S. REP. No. 216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 395-410 (1987)
(Chapter 26 of the Iran-Contra Report, "The Boland Amendments and the NSC Staff").
107. Relevant statutes are legion. Some examples include the Neutrality Act provisions
codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 956, 959, 960, and the War Powers Resolution provisions codified at
50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548. See J. STORY, supra note 102, §§ 1163-82, at 94-102.
108. See authorities cited supra notes 97 & 102.
109. 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (1610).
110. Id at 652 ("[W]hen an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or
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taken without affirmative congressional approval may also be unlaw-
ful, depending on one's interpretation of the Constitution.111 I have
defended the view that all presidential military activity, other than
repelling a sudden attack, requires congressional authorization, at
least if the activity involves what are, under international law, acts of
war.
1 12
Treaties, such as the United Nations Charter, 3 and agreements
on arms limitation,I 4 also define the limits of lawful executive power.
But there is another, long recognized source of "law" in the United
States-namely, customary international law. For example, when the
Spanish-American War broke out, the United States Navy put a
blockade around Cuba. Two Cuban fishing vessels, returning with
their cargoes of fish, were seized by the Navy, claimed as prizes of
war, and taken to Key West, Florida. There, they were forfeited to
the United States by judicial order. In The Paquete Habana,II5 how-
ever, the Supreme Court reversed the seizure order, holding that the
rules of customary international law were part of the "laws"
embraced within the supremacy clause. 1 6 Under customary interna-
tional law, fishing vessels peaceably engaged in their trade were
exempt from seizure as prizes of war. 7 Therefore, the Navy was
repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such
Act to be void."); see Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L. REv. 30
(1926).
111. The most complete collection of material from the Vietnam War era is the series of
volumes edited by Richard Falk, supra note 97. More recent military incursions have added
urgency to the debate, but not much to the scholarship in the area.
112. See Tigar, supra note 77, at 1170 nn.152-54. See generally authorities cited in R.
FALK, supra note 97.
113. Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 (entered into
force October 24, 1945).
114. See, e.g., Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States-
USSR, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 (entered into force Oct. 3, 1972); Treaty on the
Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, February 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T.
701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337 (entered into force May 18, 1972); Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered
into force March 5, 1970); Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water, August 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43
(entered into force October 10, 1963).
115. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
116. Id. at 700. See Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary
International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 321 (1985); see also
Agora, May the President Violate Customary International Law?, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 371
(1987) (comments by Kirgis, D'Amato, Paust); Agora, May the President Violate Customary
International Law?, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913 (1986) (comments by Charney, Glennon, and
Henkin); Henkin. International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555
(1984).
117. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 686.
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ordered to restore the proceeds of sale to the vessel owners, with dam-
ages and costs.1
18
Since 1900, international law has undergone enormous change.
Its content has grown to embrace new rights of persons, entities, and
nations."l 9 Most courts have agreed that individuals as such are bene-
ficiaries of rights granted by international law, and may enforce such
rights in judicial proceedings. 20 Some judges, such as Judge Bork in
his concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,12 1 have
doubted that individuals, who are not subject to obligations under
international law in their individual, as opposed to official, capacities,
may enforce such rights. Such views, however, are inconsistent with a
growing international consensus.
122
118. Id. at 714.
119. See, e.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter), June 27,
1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (not yet in force); Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism
Taking the Forms of Crime Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of International
Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413 (Organization of American
States (OAS) Convention) (entered into force Oct. 20, 1976); American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Official Records OEA/Ser. K/XVI/l.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr.
1, Jan. 7, 1970 (entered into force June, 1978); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953); Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S.
135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan.
12, 1951); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N.
GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/777 (1948); Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, June
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945). See also Continuing
Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 511, 101 Stat. 1329, 1329-155
(prohibiting expenditure of funds to aid any government's effort to "repress the legitimate
rights of the population of such country contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.").
120. See Tigar, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Pursued Refugee: Lessons
from Letelier v. Chile, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 421, 426-27; see also Bassiouni,
International Criminal Law and Human Rights, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 15
(M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1986).
The principle that international law may of its own force confer individually enforceable
rights has long been a part of American law. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407
(1886) (violation of the rule of specialty under an extradition treaty violates the rights of both
the requesting state and the prisoner).
121. 726 F.2d 774, 808-10 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
122. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (Deliberate torture under color
of official authority violates international norms of human rights behavior so that Alien Tort
Statute (28 U.S.C. § 1350) provides jurisdiction over alleged torturer found and served with
process within United States borders, regardless of nationality of parties.); see also
Government of Costa Rica (In the Matter of Vivian Gallerdo et al.), No. G101/81, 2 Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. 12 (1982) (Decision of Nov. 13, 1981) (Determination of whether death of
citizen in prison constituted human rights violation was responsibility of Inter-American
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In sum, Presidents and their agents-including military com-
manders and troops-are subject to the commands of customary
international law that limit violations by one nation of another
nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and that limit interfer-
ence in another nation's internal affairs. My summary of the sources
of law is quite independent of my earlier discussion of the proper role
of the judiciary. Even if one believes that judges should not interfere
with particular kinds of executive decisions, the rules of law are still
there, and a President's obedience to them is at least a function of the
oath of office.
Let me make no mistake about my meaning. I tremble for my
country when I see the President proclaim that he and his staff are not
bound by congressional restrictions on how appropriated funds are
spent, even though article I of the Constitution clearly gives the Con-
gress the power over the public monies.'23 Similarly, the supremacy
clause makes binding on the United States those treaties to which it is
a party, including those provisions that accord jurisdiction over dis-
putes to international tribunals. The President, as with the spending
of the public monies, cannot choose to ignore or deride these provi-
sions. Everyone who takes the supremacy clause seriously must insist
that the President not be permitted to pick and choose which parts of
the Constitution, laws, and treaties he will obey.
For example, in Nicaragua v. United States,'24 the United States
Commission on Human Rights.); Case of X v. United Kingdom, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1981) (scrutinizing procedures for confinement to mental institutions); Golder Case, 18 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1975) (European Convention creates right of access to courts and right to
counsel); Lawless Case, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1961) (Detention without trial under unusual
circumstances did not violate Articles 5 and 6 of European Convention.). But see Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808-10 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (rejecting
Filartiga, arguing congressional grant of jurisdiction did not create a cause of action, and
concluding treaties do not confer privately enforceable rights unless treaty self-executing).
For a discussion of the issues raised by the erection of an international human
rights standard, see HUMAN RIGHTS, AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
BIBLIOGRAPHY (J. Friedman & M. Sherman eds. 1985); HUMAN RIGHTs IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (T. Meron ed. 1984); E. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(1973); L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS (1973); THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS (L. Henkin ed. 1981); THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS (K. Vasak ed., P. Alston trans. ed. 1982); Buergenthal, The Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 231 (1982); Henkin, International Human Rights as
"Rights," 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 446 (1979); Lillich & Paxman, State Responsibility for Injuries
to Aliens Caused by Terrorist Activity, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 217 (1976-1977); Schwelb, The
International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clause of the Charter, 66 AM. J. INT'L L.
337 (1972); Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity of Human Rights Norms, 1979 U.
ILL. L.F. 609.
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 12; art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
124. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
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attempted to revoke its long standing acceptance of jurisdiction by the
International Court of Justice. Laudably, despite the opening pro-
vided by the United States' continued insistence that the International
Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction, the court fulfilled its duty by
accepting the case, investigating the facts, finding the law, and ruling
on the merits. 25 By a lopsided majority, the court proclaimed that
the United States' actions violated settled rules of international law,
regarding the conduct of nations.
1 26
The President and his advisers first derided, then ignored, the
Court's decision 127-a defiance that sets them against the supremacy
clause, and weakens an already fragile, though decisively important,
participant in the quest for peace and freedom in the international
community. I would add that in grasping at the prerequisites of the
imperial presidency, the incumbent has sought to curb dissent by
imposing far reaching curbs on free access to governmental informa-
tion, all in the name of national security, and supposedly insulated
from meaningful judicial review.
1 28
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment on Merits of June 27, 1986), discussed in Highet,
Evidence, the Court and the Nicaragua Case, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1987); see also Maier,
Appraisal of the ICJ's Decision: Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 77
(1987) (comments by Briggs, Boyle, Christenson, D'Amato, Falk, Farer, Franck, Glennon,
Gordon, Hargrove, Janis, Kirgis, Moore, Morrison, Reisman, Teson).
125. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.). 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 17, 22-26 (Judgment on Merits of June 27, 1986). On
November 26, 1984, the court found that it had jurisdiction and accepted the Nicaraguan
application. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 392 (Judgment of Jurisdiction and Admissibility of Application of November 26,
1984). In response, the Agent of the United States, on January 18, 1985, informed the court
that the United States would no longer appear. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.). 1985 I.C.J. 3 (Memorial Order of Jan. 22, 1985). Although
expressing its regret, the court did not refuse to further hear the case. The court recalled to the
United States:
Having taken part in the proceedings to argue that the Court lacked jurisdiction,
the United States thereby acknowledged that the Court had the power to make a
finding on its own jurisdiction to rule upon the merits. In the normal course of
events, for a party to appear before a court entails acceptance of the possibility of
the court's finding against that party. Furthermore the Court is bound to
emphasize that the non-participation of a party in the proceedings at any stage of
the case cannot, in any circumstances, affect the validity of its judgment. Nor
does such validity depend upon the acceptance of that judgment by one party.
The fact that a State purports to "reserve its rights" in respect of a future
decision of the Court, after the Court has determined that it has jurisdiction, is
clearly of no effect on the validity of that decision.
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 23-24.
126. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 146-50.
127. See Highet, supra note 124. See also Maier, supra note 124.
128. See, e.g., Federal Polygraph Limitation and Anti-Censorship Act, 1984: Hearings on
H.R. 4681 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the
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D. Implications for Today
More years ago than I care to remember, I studied with the
French conservative political theorist Bertrand de Jouvenel. I was
eager to judge political decisions of the past and present as right or
wrong by my perhaps dim, but always unwaering, lights. Professor
de Jouvenel reminded me that the most enduring lesson of great con-
troversies, such as Truman's steel seizure and the commitment of
troops to the Korean conflict, was that in our passion to see a decision
made in a particular way, we too quickly forgot our most cherished
convictions as to who was competent to make that decision.
Now, as then, that is the first lesson. Agreement or disagreement
with the policies of a particular President cannot blind us to the duties
of the legislative and the judicial branches to play their important
parts. It is no answer to say, "The President is elected to make these
decisions." The members of Congress are elected for this purpose as
well. And, as the very structure of the Constitution makes clear, the
non-elected judges are put in place precisely to enforce constitution-
ally based principles of supremacy of law, even when those principles
are rooted in countermajoritarian values.
A corollary principle is that the political question doctrine,
invoked at times by the courts as a barrier to deciding the legality of
foreign and military affairs decisions that touch on private rights, is
unprincipled and illegitimate. I argued this in 1970 and am more
than ever convinced of this fact by the laudatory terms in which the
doctrine is described by its adherents. They like it precisely because
of its "flexibility," although they concede that its "contours are
murky and uncertain."' 2 9 For me, this flexibility and uncertainty
translates in practice into an unfettered judicial discretion to duck the
duties and surrender the powers that article III clearly confers.
The second lesson is this: In the criminal law of Texas, if you
have suffered an indignity or endured a threat, you can go home, stew
about it for a while, return to the scene hours, or days, or weeks later,
blow away your antagonist, and still have a good defense to a murder
charge.' 30 In the 19th-century, it was sort of like that for big powers.
Judiciary, H.R. REP. No. 123, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1984) (statement of Michael E. Tigar,
Raybourne Thompson Centennial Prof. of Law, Univ. of Texas, Austin).
129. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring).
130. While Texas adheres to the requirement that only "the immediate influence of sudden
passion" will reduce a homicide offense from murder to manslaughter, TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 19.04(a) (Vernon 1974), that is not the end of the story. The accused will generally be
entitled to an instruction that he had the right to carry arms "to the scene of the difficulty and
seek an explanation." See Ruiz v. State, 747 S.W.2d 535, 538 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); Mathews v.
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If William Randolph Hearst and Teddy Roosevelt thought we should
go down into some small Latin American or Caribbean country,
avenge some insult, grab some territory, and further our theory of
government, well, that was the way it was. But in today's world, we
are all-to my regret, at times-living a little closer together and the
armament is a little more powerful.
1 3 1
In the wake of World War II, the dozens of newly independent
nation-states asserted their rights to develop along their own lines,
perhaps in ways that we have disapproved. They are reshaping not
only domestic politics, but also the landscape of international law.
The principles of international law are coming to dictate what com-
mon sense should have told us: The new age requires more, and not
less, restraint in foreign and military policy. It requires more, and not
less, attention to the principles of domestic and international law,
which the Constitution makes the supreme law of the land. That is
why we must pay renewed attention to the law and its enforcement.
That is why the Reagan administration has failed America.
III. EUGENE V. ROSTOW
Let me start this talk by recalling what I regard as the most
important and most profound sentence John Marshall ever wrote:
"Let us never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding.'
1 32
By that I think Marshall meant at least three things. First, the Con-
State, 708 S.W.2d 835, 837-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Banks v. State, 656 S.W.2d 446, 447
(Tex. Crim. App. 1983). Under the former Texas law, the grade of a homicide offense was
reduced if the victim had insulted the accused's female relative. See Pitts v. State, 29 Tex.
App. 374, 16 S.W. 189 (Tex. Ct. App. 1891); Norman v. State, 26 Tex. App. 221, 9 S.W. 606
(Tex. Ct. App. 1888); Willis v. State, 74 Tex. Crim. 16, 166 S.W. 1172 (Tex. Crim. App. 1914);
Thompson v. State, 72 Tex. Crim. 659, 163 S.W. 973 (Tex. Crim. App. 1914); Wright v. State,
36 Tex. Crim. 427, 37 S.W. 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1896); Jones v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. 492, 26
S.W. 1082 (Tex. Crim. App. 1894). If the insult was not made to the victim's face, but was
reported to the defendant by another person, it would be enough to trigger this provision if the
victim killed the victim when next they met. See Mathews v. State, 708 S.W.2d 835 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986); Dyson v. State, 672 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Banks v. State, 656
S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Tave v. State, 620 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
131. At the Symposium, where these thoughts were first expressed, Professor Rostow
remarked to me during a break that "You do not understand anything about self-defense." I
have read the recent literature expounding a right of self-defense that includes anticipatory
invasion of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other states. Nothing in the
jurisprudence of any international tribunal, and nothing in the history of either the Security
Council or the General Assembly, justifies such views. The only conceivable justification is an
expansive conception of United States' security interests that is at war with the collective
security obligations of the United Nations Charter, and cynical in light of our rejection of ICJ
jurisdiction in Nicaragua v. United States. The United States cannot unilaterally define its
rights by expanding its claims to dominance: A buffalo does not become a giraffe simply by
sticking its neck out.
132. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
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stitution is not a prolix code. Rather, it is a short, clear, general out-
line of the structure and principle of government, an outline every
citizen can understand. He thought this dimension of the Constitu-
tion was an infinitely valuable resource for a society of free men and
women, and a most appropriate starting place for the evolution of a
body of law. Second, the Constitution leaves ample room for growth
and adaptation as its general principles are applied to the necessities
of governance in a constantly changing world. The third implication
of Marshall's sentence is that the Constitution requires continuity-in
values and broad policy, not in detail- as well as flexibility and adap-
tation to change. Marshall's jurisprudence is far too sophisticated to
exaggerate the role of original intent among the forces which govern
the growth of the law.
Article II is an excellent vehicle for examining the implications
of Marshall's thesis. As Secretary Weinberger' 3 3 and Mr. Cooper
1 34
pointed out, the Presidency is one of the principal creations of the
Founding Fathers-a carefully considered response to the inadequa-
cies of the government of the United States under the Continental
Congress and the Articles of Confederation. A strong, unified, and
independent Executive was a felt necessity at the time of the Conven-
tion. Hamilton said:
Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in
the necessity of an energetic executive, it will only remain to
inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this energy?...
The ingredients which constitute energy in the executive are unity;
duration; an adequate provision for its support; and competent
powers.... That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed.
Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize
the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than
the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the
number is increased, these qualities will be diminished."
'1 35
133. Due to prior publication commitments, Secretary Weinberger's remarks could not be
included in this symposium.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 31-41.
135. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 423-24 (A. Hamilton) (G. Carey & W. Kendall ed. 1966).
Hamilton was even more emphatic on the Executive's capability of acting with energy, secrecy,
and dispatch when he argued why the Executive, instead of the Congress, should be entrusted
with the primary role in negotiating treaties and conducting foreign relations. Hamilton
wrote:
Accurate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and
systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to
national character; decision, secrecy, and dispatch, are incompatible with the
genius of a body so variable and so numerous.
THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 452 (A. Hamilton) (G. Carey & W. Kendall ed. 1966) (emphasis
original). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 392 (J. Jay) (G. Carey & W. Kendall ed. 1966)
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The President was not to be elected by Congress; rather, he was to be
elected by the people, through the electoral college.1 36 Furthermore,
in many of the most important aspects of his duty, he was not and is
not responsible to Congress but, as Marshall said, is "accountable
only to his country in his political character, and to his own
conscience."1
37
Marshall's observation is under severe attack today as Congress
continues its relentless post-Vietnam drive for supremacy. I submit,
however, that the President's prerogative powers will survive, and
indeed prevail, if Presidents fight for them, because they correspond
to the nature of things and the necessities of government in the United
States. That phrase, "the nature of things," has a long history, and
was a great favorite in the rational atmosphere of the eighteenth cen-
tury. In the famous first paragraph of The Spirit of the Laws, Montes-
quieu said, "Laws, in their most general signification, are the
necessary relations arising from the nature of things. The principle
applies to the societies of man as it does to the physical universe."'' 3
What is the executive power vested in the President by article II?
Mr. Cooper read you some passages from Locke.' 39 There are other
sources, however, that can be brought forward. Hamilton said that
the executive power is all governmental power that is not judicial or
legislative in character.11° This definition is an odd but decidedly use-
ful way to examine the problem, even though it is not fully adequate.
In many instances, for example, the President may act, and in some
instances he must act, even though Congress may also act but has not
yet done so.
The case to which Mr. Cooper referred,' 4 ' that of Washington's
neutrality proclamation of 1793, illustrates the interdependence of the
executive and the legislative power. Washington issued the proclama-
tion, although later Congress had to pass a neutrality act to imple-
ment and give the proclamation effect.142 By the way, some parts of
("It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature, but that perfect secrecy
and immediate dispatch are sometimes requisite.") (emphasis original).
136. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cls. 2-5.
137. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, at 166.
138. C. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 15, at 1.
139. See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text.
140. Pacificus No. I, Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia) June 29, 1793, reprinted in
15 H. SYRETr, supra note 46, at 37-43.
141. See supra notes 42-67 and accompanying text.
142. Proclamation of Neutrality, No. 65, ASP, Foreign Relations I, 140, 3d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1793), reprinted in 32 J. FITZPATRICK, supra note 45, at 430-31. Congress subsequently
passed legislation making it unlawful to: (1) Serve or agree to serve a foreign state; (2) leave the
United States for the purpose of enlisting in the service of a foreign state; (3) fit out a ship of
war, or augment its force; (4) commit or aid in the commission of hostilities upon citizens of
(Vol. 43:165
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that act are still on the books.' 43
Sometimes, however, even when Congress has acted, a change in
circumstance may justify a President's acting independently. Yester-
day, a particular episode was discussed. I do not know whether the
facts as presented are correct, but let us assume that they are. It was
said that President Franklin Roosevelt informed the British of the
location of the Bismarck during the Second World War, at a time
when the United States was still neutral. The question presented to
the speaker was whether the action by President Roosevelt was legal.
The answer was that Roosevelt's conduct was illegal.
I believe that in an episode of this kind, the legal problem is far
more complex than yesterday's brief discussion indicated. John
Locke said that under exceptional circumstances the Executive could
indeed ignore a statute in the exercise of his inherent powers.'" The
Supreme Court also addressed the issue in the important case of
Mississippi v. Johnson.'45 I think it is a great mistake, and also a com-
mon one, to assume that Lincoln violated the Constitution in order to
save the union. In my view, the emergency prerogative powers Lin-
coln exercised should be considered constitutional because they were
necessary, in his judgment, under the circumstances. That is the
profound teaching of Madison's Federalist Number 41.'"
foreign states; and (5) set on foot an expedition against a foreign state. The President was
authorized to use military forces to enforce the law. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381
(1794), repealed by Act of April 20, 1818, ch. 88, 3 Stat. 450 (1818). Additionally, the
Congress had previously authorized the President to lay embargoes on all ships and vessels in
United States' ports, as he thought necessary. Act of June 4, 1794, ch. 41, 1 Stat. 372 (1794).
143. The current neutrality provisions are codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 951-970 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986) (criminal penalties), and 22 U.S.C. §§ 401-465 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (war
materials prohibitions (§§ 401-422), neutrality (§§ 441-457), and prevention of neutrality
violations (§§ 461-465)). The carryover provisions are found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 958-968 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986).
144. 2 J. LOCKE, supra note 6, at 392-93.
145. Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475, 499 (1886) (President may not be restrained by
injunction from executing act of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional; general principles
"forbid judicial interference with the exercise of Executive discretion.").
146. THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 255-64 (J. Madison) (G. Carey & W. Kendall ed. 1966).
Madison addressed the powers conferred on the federal government, arguing that the powers
granted "were necessary means of attaining a necessary end." Id. at 255. Madison paid
particular attention to the security powers conferred, noting that "security against foreign
danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. It is an avowed and essential object of the
American Union." Id. at 256. Disunion was an evil that would overshadow any potential for
abuse of the powers conferred. Madison argued:
This picture of disunion cannot be too highly colored, or too often exhibited.
Every man who loves peace, every man who loves his country, every man who
loves liberty ought to have it ever before his eyes that he may cherish in his heart
a due attachment to the Union of America and be able to set a due value on the
means of preserving it.
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I should like to begin, however, with the self-evident proposition
that under international law, the United States has all the powers of
sovereignty that other states possess, including the sovereign power to
disobey and violate international law and suffer the international con-
sequences. 147 The Constitution divides those powers between the
President and Congress on the principle of functional necessity. All
the executive power of the United States, subject to some exceptions,
is vested in the President, and all the national legislative power of the
United States belongs to Congress, subject also to some exceptions.
As Madison said, the principle of separation of powers does not
really call for separation, but for intermingling and interdepen-
dence. 48  The executive power, according to Montesquieu, has two
great categories-the executive power in respect to things dependent
on the law of nations, and the executive power in regard to matters
that depend on the civil law. 149 The essential fact about this division
is that it cannot survive, as Professor Corwin wrote, unless each
department can defend its characteristic functions against intrusion
by either of the others. 150 This is our principal constitutional problem
today, because as Madison warned, the framers were so preoccupied
with the risks of executive tyranny that they seemed "never to have
recollected the danger from legislative usurpations."'1 51
In characterizing the Presidency, I stand largely with Professor
Corwin's conclusion. After reviewing the early history and the writ-
ings of the teachers of the framers, Corwin stated:
[T]he fact is that what the framers had in mind was not the cabinet
system as yet nonexistent even in Great Britain, but the 'balanced
Id. at 259.
Because unity was the essential goal of the Constitution, Lincoln's exercise of emergency
prerogative powers was not merely necessary, but rather, it was a necessity.
147. See, e.g., Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 59 (1958) (Congress had authority to
withdraw citizenship of United States citizens voting in foreign elections because the citizen's
action might be construed to be a "reflection if not an expression" of United States policy,
creating responsibility on the part of the United States.); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890)
(analogizing right of United States to appoint federal marshall's to protect Supreme Court
justices to right of United States to threaten military action, without express congressional or
treaty provision, to protect life and liberty of United States resident alien wrongfully detained
abroad); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 666 (1884) (The United States is "clothed with the
principal attributes of political sovereignty.") (quoting 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 201 (O.W. Holmes 12th ed. 1873)); Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 465 (D.C.
Cir.) ("Congress may nullify, in whole or in part, a treaty commitment."), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 931 (1972); see also Rostow, "Once More Unto the Breach": The War Powers Resolution
Revisited, 21 VALPARAISO U.L. REV. 1, 12-15 (1986).
148. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308-13 (. Madison) (G. Carey & W. Kendall ed. 1966).
149. C. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 15, at 151.
150. E. COR WIN, supra note 16, at 9.
151. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 310 (J. Madison) (G. Carey & W. Kendall ed. 1966).
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constitution' of Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone, which car-
red with it the idea of a divided initiative in the matter of legisla-
tion and a broad range of autonomous executive power or
'prerogative.' Sir Henry Maine's dictum that 'the American Con-
stitution is the British Constitution with the monarchy left out' is,
from the point of view of 1789 almost the exact reverse of the
truth, for the presidency was designed in great measure to
reproduce the monarchy of George III with the corruption left out,
and also, of course, the hereditary feature.'5 2
Comparisons between the parliamentary system and the presi-
dential system invariably fail for a variety of reasons. The President is
not, and never can be, a Prime Minister. He is elected by a different
constituency, serves for a fixed term, and, in many aspects of his duty,
is not answerable to Congress. The fact that the Presidency was
intended to be a strong independent office, and that he had a vaguely
defined prerogative power carried over from the British Constitution,
is undeniable. The exceptions to which I referred earlier in the alloca-
tion of legislative and executive authority, however, are genuinely
important-that is, the participation of the Senate in the appointment
of officers,1 53 and the ratification, but not the negotiation of, trea-
ties, 154 and the power of Congress to declare war. 5
The language of the two paragraphs of article I, section 8, deal-
ing with the war powers is concerned with matters of international
law: defining and punishing piracies and felonies committed on the
high seas, and against the law of nations, 156 declaring war, granting
letters of marque and reprisal, and making rules concerning captures
on land and water.157 These are all matters of international law, and
the meaning of those words is their international law meaning. It
should be remarked that the Founding Fathers were far more familiar
with international law than most lawyers are today, because of the
way the Founding Fathers were trained. I said recently that, with the
possible exception of the provision of the Constitution requiring two
Senators from each state, these two paragraphs are among the least
ambiguous paragraphs in the Constitution. 58
The declaration of war provision does not mean what Professor
Tigar said it means. It does not vest Congress with the supreme
power over war, subject to a narrow exception for defense against sud-
152. E. CORWIN, supra note 16, at 14-15.
153. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
154. Id.
155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
156. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
157. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
158. Rostow, supra note 147, at 6.
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den attack. It vests in the President the power to decide when to use
the national forces in all cases except those rare ones when general
war is indicated-that is, general, rather than limited, war. In inter-
national law, the distinction between limited war and general war is
the distinction that legitimizes the use of limited force during peace
time in order to cure violent breaches of international law that violate
the rights of states.
Mr. Cooper quoted remarks of Hamilton and Jefferson which
treat the power of Congress to declare war as an exception to the
general rule that instituting the use of the national forces is a matter
for the President to determine.1"9 Like all exceptions, it is to be
strictly construed. Mr. Cooper, Hamilton, and Jefferson are surely
right, although the rule is somewhat blurred because Presidents have
prudently sought to obtain congressional support for their use of the
national forces, particularly when the circumstances required an
extended or a particularly bitter and divisive campaign.
Of course, there have been two schools of thought on this subject
from the beginning, especially at the political level. This is certainly
evident in the exchange between Hamilton and Madison to which Mr.
Cooper referred,"6 and it has been true in the pattern of our history
ever since.16  The pattern of constitutional practice, however, has
been fairly clear cut in recognizing a distinct executive power to act in
the field of foreign affairs. Those who cling to the notion of a congres-
sional supremacy have attempted to ignore it for as long as they can.
The history of the War Powers Resolution illustrates the paradox
very well.
The draftsmen of the War Powers Resolution started out bravely
with the premise of congressional supremacy. 62 They felt that with-
out the prior consent of Congress, the President could only use the
national forces to repel sudden attacks.163 After examining our con-
stitutional history and the facts of life, however, they wound up with
the present War Powers Resolution which recognizes that the Presi-
dent must have a great deal of discretion in using or threatening to use
the national forces in many peacetime circumstances.164 Of course, in
159. See supra notes 46-47, 49-58, 67 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 46-47, 49-58, 60-65 and accompanying text.
161. Compare Tigar, supra note 77 with Rostow, supra note 147, at 6. See Comment,
Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, supra note 102.
162. H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), 119 CONG. REC. 14,234 (1973).
163. See H.R. REP. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 2346, 2349; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 547, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8,
reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2346, 2364 (Consultation provision
indicating prior consultation will not always be possible.).
164. See 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) ("The President in every possible
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the War Powers Resolution, Congress tried to limit the President's
discretion to ninety days, in the name of the necessary and proper
clause. 165 That, however, is constitutional nonsense.
The War Powers Resolution is profoundly unconstitutional, not
simply because it violates Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha,'66 but for much deeper separation of powers reasons as well.
For example, many people say that the reporting requirement is an
innocent sort of provision. After all, we want freedom of information,
and we all have a right to know, don't we? Surely that is constitu-
tional, isn't it? There are times, however, when the President should
not report to Congress or, indeed, to anyone else. We heard Judge
Webster talk about some of the provisions for congressional oversight
of intelligence activities. 67 The President does not report to all the
members of Congress in this context. Rather, he reports to a small
number of members of Congress, the Gang of Eight as he said, or in
'some instances, an even smaller group, to satisfy the oversight
requirement.
1 68
There are a lot of things that the President should not report.
Perhaps the most important event in President Nixon's term of office
was the nuclear warning that he gave to the Soviet Union. That
warning was given in order to prevent a nuclear attack by the Soviet
Union against China. In the "nature of things," such supremely
important actions can be effective only if they are secret. Similarly,
President Johnson gave nuclear hints to the Soviet Union to keep
them out of the 1967 Middle East conffict, and, of course, Truman did
the same thing in Korea. Everybody who participated in the drafting
of the War Powers Resolution, and all those persons testifying, agreed
that the use of nuclear weapons had to be left to the sole control of the
President. 169 This seems to me to give away the entire issue, and to
instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into
hostilities ....").
165. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2b, 87 Stat. 555, 555 (1973) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) (purpose and policy). This section
combines two Senate amendments to H.R.J. Res. 542 which sought to define the President's
powers to commit armed forces to combat. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 547, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 7, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2346,2363-64.
166. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding one House of Congress legislative veto provision,
§ 244(c)(2) of Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2), unconstitutional as
violative of the bicameralism requirement, U.S. CONST., art. I, §§ 1, 7, and the presentment
clauses, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3).
167. See Webster, The Role of Intelligence in a Free Society, 43 U. MIAMi L. REv. 155, 158-
59 (1988).
168. Id. at 159.
169. See H.R. REP. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMiN. NEWS 2346, 2349-51 (statement of intent and effect and section 2 analysis).
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confirm what I said about the nature of the problem of presidential
versus congressional discretion. Only the President can possibly con-
trol the use of nuclear weapons. Everyone agrees, therefore, that the
President has to be allowed to use them.
The essence of the presidential prerogative that we have been
talking about as part of the executive power was defined best by the
practices of President Lincoln. What I emphasize today is that there
is a reservoir of national powers defined by international law, that
Congress and the President possess because we are a nation. The
President possesses some of those powers that are executive in charac-
ter because he is the Chief Executive. The presidential powers men-
tioned in article II-the power to pardon, 70 to call out the militia,"'1
the veto power, 77 and so on-are instances of the executive power,
not the whole of it. I recall to you the powerful opinion on this sub-
ject by Justice Miller in Ex parte Yarbrough,173 one of my favorite
cases, but one of the most neglected major opinions in the reports. It
is rarely found in a case book. We should not regard the examples of
Franklin Roosevelt, Lincoln, and Truman, in using the national force
without prior congressional approval, as violations of law. They were
helping to define the law because law is much more than a chronicle
of what the courts say, or even what the courts decide.
I would submit that Korematsu ' 74 has already been overruled in
fact, although the Supreme Court has never explicitly overruled it.
170. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
171. Id.
172. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
173. 110 U.S. 651 (1884) (denying the habeas corpus petition of eight individuals convicted
of conspiracy to prevent black citizen from exercising right to vote for member of Congress).
Mr. Justice Miller responded to the argument that, because there was no express constitutional
grant of power to Congress to enforce the right to vote, the law under which the petitioner was
convicted was null and void, as follows:
The brief of counsel before us, though directed to the authority of that body to
pass criminal laws, uses the same language [as the oft repeated textual basis
argument]. Because there is no express power to provide for preventing violence
exercised on the voter as a means of controlling his vote, no such law can be
enacted. It destroys at one blow, in construing the Constitution of the United
States, the doctrine universally applied to all instruments of writing, that what is
implied is as much a part of the instrument as what is expressed. This principle,
in its application to the Constitution of the United States, more than to almost
any other writing, is a necessity, by reason of the inherent inability to put into
words all derivative powers-a difficulty which the instrument itself recognizes
by conferring on Congress the authority to pass all laws necessary and proper to
carry into execution the powers expressly granted and all other powers vested in
the government or any branch of it by the Constitution.
Id. at 658.
174. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding order excluding Japanese-
American citizens from coastal areas).
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The case has been overruled in fact because of the criticism it has
received, and I am very grateful to Judge Winter for recalling an arti-
cle I regard as the best article I ever wrote. 17 5 Although the Supreme
Court has not overruled the case, I do not think any practicing lawyer
today would cite the decision in a brief. I think Chief Justice Mar-
shall in McCulloch 176 meant that the law is not so much what has
been said, but rather a pattern of behavior that society deems right.
His remark in McCulloch v. Maryland 17 7 means that there are great
abiding purposes and values in the Constitution that do survive and
guide us. They are simple maxims about being a government of laws
and not of men, about the separation of powers, and so on.
Of course there are limits to the power of the executive branch. I
fully agree with Professor Tigar that the courts can, do, and should
take cases that deal with defining these limits. Reid v. Covert 178 is an
example of one kind of limit on executive power. Korematsu,
179 of
course, is another.
We spend too much time trying to determine exactly how the
Founding Fathers would have dealt with the Vietnam War or the
nuclear weapon. It is an impossible exercise, and it diverts us from
more germane analyses. As Mr. Cooper pointed out, Madison and
Hamilton, who knew a great deal more about original intent than we
are ever going to know, differed about the extent of the war power
within a few years of the Convention.18 0
The great overriding policy goals of the Constitution abide, but
constitutional law, like any other law, is a living entity. Perhaps in
this context it is appropriate to reflect on the wisdom of Holmes'
famous comment: "[T]he life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience."' 81
IV. ORRIN HATCH
John Jay explained in The Federalist Papers why the President
175. Rostow, The Japanese-American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945).
176. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
177. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
178, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (Congress could not confer authority on military courts to try
United States military dependent civilians abroad, and protections of Bill of Rights apply to
actions by the government against citizens abroad.).
179. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also Bowles v. WiUingham, 321
U.S. 503, 521 (1944) ("[Even the war power does not remove constitutional limitations
safeguarding essential liberties.") (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,
426 (1934)).
180. See supra notes 46-67 and accompanying text.
181. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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was selected to propose, initiate, and generally take the lead in foreign
policy:
It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever
nature, but that perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch are some-
times requisite. There are cases where the most useful intelligence
may be obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from
apprehensions of discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on
those persons whether they are actuated by mercenary or friendly
motives; and there are doubtless many of both descriptions who
would rely on the secrecy of the President, but who would not con-
fide in the Senate, and still less in that of a large popular
assembly. 182
I might underscore the above words of John Jay by saying I am one of
those who would rely on the ability of the President to maintain
secrecy, while placing little faith in the ability of the Congress to do
SO.
The language of the Constitution, rather than the President's
ability to maintain secrecy, assigns the President the preeminent role
in foreign affairs. The Constitution permits the President, via the
appointment power, to place delegates-his ambassadors-in every
land.183 Thus, he is assured access to worldwide intelligence. Fur-
ther, the President and his agents do not take occasional recesses;
rather, they are perpetually on duty, ready for action. Moreover, the
Constitution assigns the President the role of negotiating treaties,184
receiving foreign delegations,"8 5 and generally proposing the shape of
our foreign policy. Thus, the President can better articulate a clear
and consistent policy. In short, the President is quite clearly assigned
the position of leadership in United States foreign affairs.
This is not to say that Congress does not have a role in the for-
eign policy process. Congress cooperates in this process by review-
ing, accepting, or rejecting those policies proposed by the President.
The Congress accomplishes this by what I call its "checking func-
tion," which is evident in the Senate's role in advising and consenting
on executive branch nominations1 86 and treaties, 8 7 and in the Con-
gress' power of the purse.s The power to check, however, is not the
power to control. The checking function must never be allowed to
182. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 392 (J. Jay) (G. Carey & W. Kendall ed. 1966) (emphasis
in original).
183. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
184. Id
185. U.S. CONST. art II, § 3.
186. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
187. Id.
188. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
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swallow the general foreign policy power of the President. We must
not forget that the President is, to quote then Congressman John
Marshall, "the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its
sole representative with foreign nations."1' 9
The Constitution contains no clear-cut principle that defines how
these general grants of authority should interface. Similarly, because
of political questions, standing, and other justiciability doctrines,
sweeping cases concerning separation of powers, such as United States
v. Nixon ,"9 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer,'91 and United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,192 have only rarely reached the
courts. Thus, the Supreme Court has not articulated any explicit
principle that reconciles the Congress' power with the President's
own foreign policy prerogatives.
The closest attempt to articulate such a principle is Justice Jack-
son's observation in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. He said:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an expressed or
implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum,
for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that
Congress can delegate ....
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congres-
sional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribu-
tion is uncertain ....
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest
ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers
minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter ....
This does little more than state the obvious fact that many constitu-
tional questions involving the respective powers of the legislative and
executive branches are resolved by a pattern of construction and prac-
tice between these two political branches. Thus, it is likely to be left
up to the Congress and the President, rather than relying upon the
Court, to resolve and reconcile their respective foreign policy
responsibilities.
189. 10 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 613 (J. Gales ed. 1800).
190. 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (holding that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the
generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain
an absolute unqualified presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all
circumstances).
191. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
192. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
193. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38.
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Although the Court is not likely to set explicit limits, there
clearly are limits on Congress' ability to force compliance with its
policies. The appropriation power provides a good example of this
interplay. How do we reconcile the appropriations clause with the
President's foreign policy power? The President is given the power to
lead in foreign policy; the Congress has the power of the purse. Does
this suggest that the Congress can control foreign policy by refusing
to appropriate funds? I think it is clear that constitutional foreign
policy functions may not be eliminated by a congressional refusal to
appropriate funds. The Congress may not, for example, deny the Pres-
ident funding to receive ambassadors, negotiate treaties, or deliver
foreign policy addresses. This point is implicit in the reasoning of
United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp.,194 where the Court held
that the President had broad discretion to carry out a congressional
law that gave him authority to embargo arms.1 95 How can the Presi-
dent exercise this discretion without the funding to either obtain
information or act upon his determinations?
By the same token, it is clear that the President's foreign policy
authority does not compel the Congress to appropriate funds exactly
as the President desires. Congress is given discretion to appropriate
funds as it sees fit, and the President participates in that process by
wielding his veto power. In sum, the Constitution does not explicitly
194. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
195. Id. (It is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers for Congress to
authorize President to determine whether (1) embargo should go into effect, (2) when it may be
terminated, and (3) the enforcement limits and exceptions.). Mr. Justice Sutherland reasoned
that the delegation here was permissible because:
[w]e are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the President by an
exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate,
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations-a power which does not
require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like
every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the
applicable provisions of the Constitution. It is quite apparent that if, in the
maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment-perhaps serious
embarrassment-is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved,
congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and
inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree
of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be
admissible were domestic affairs alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has
the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential
sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular
and other officials. Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be
highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of harmful
results.
Id. at 320.
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articulate a principle governing the degree to which Congress can
condition foreign policy appropriations.
Other examples of this interplay are found in the processes of
treaty and government recognition. Although the President makes
treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate, he alone negotiates
them. Thus, the Senate can debate and express its approval or disap-
proval of an agreement the President has negotiated, but it cannot
enter the field of negotiations itself. And although the President has
the power to grant or deny recognition to other governments, the
Congress can indicate its support or disapproval of this recognition by
various means.
In my opinion, Congress oversteps its role when it undertakes to
dictate the specific terms of international relations. This is a power
granted specifically to the executive branch, which is equipped to
acquire the information necessary for foreign policy creation. Thus,
when the Congress enters into the process of creating new policies by,
for example, permitting certain forms of humanitarian aid, but not
others, it is venturing beyond its own constitutional mission and, in
fact, attempting to formulate foreign policy.
What are some of the historical rebuttals to executive power?
First, some might assert that history tends to give wide breadth to
Congress' spending power in relation to the President's foreign policy
role. Prior to 1787, the English Parliament used the spending power
to wrench control from the King.1 96 Moreover, colonial legislatures
established similar superiority concerning funding questions over the
colonial governors.' 9 ' Some have argued that these precedents mean
Congress may use the spending clause as a check on the fear that the
President might tend to acquire kingly preeminence. 98
I think the response to this line of reasoning is direct. The 1787
Convention did not adopt a parliamentary system with unquestioned
legislative dominance. Rather, it adopted a government consisting of
three coequal branches, under which the Executive received, for the
reasons mentioned before, the preeminent authority over foreign pol-
icy. Unlike parliamentary systems, the legislature in our system does
not have automatic dominance over the other departments of the gov-
ernment. To the degree that it attempts to assert such dominance,
196. See, e.g., C. STEVENS, SOURCES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 86-
116 (1894); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, at 359 (J. Madison) (G. Carey & W. Kendall ed.
1966).
197. See, e.g., 0. DICKERSON, AMERICAN COLONIAL GOVERNMENT 1696-1765, at 158-79
(1912); A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, H. BELZ, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION ITS ORIGINS
AND DEVELOPMENT 33-34 (1948).
198. See H.R. REP. No. 433, S. REP. No. 216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 411-12 (1987).
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Congress misreads the balance of powers envisioned by the
Constitution.
Second, many senators argue that the conduct of foreign policy is
essentially a concurrent power. Congress has certain foreign policy
duties, such as the earmarking of taxpayer dollars. 99 The President
has certain other duties, such as the negotiation of treaties. 2°° Thus,
the argument goes: Foreign affairs is a shared power, and the Presi-
dent cannot flaunt or ignore the role of Congress by disregarding
directions contained, or implicit, in appropriations bills.
A reasonable response to that argument might be: Yes, the Con-
stitution does envision some overlap of authority with respect to for-
eign affairs. This is healthy because it operates as a check and
balance. Furthermore, the requirement of some concurrence between
Congress and the executive branch ensures that a national consensus
is formed if the nation is committed to new foreign policy directions.
When Congress presumes to wrench from the President his role as
chief articulator and sole organ of foreign policy leadership by dictat-
ing conditions and appropriations bills, however, it steps away from
its role as a check on how tax dollars are, or should be, spent and
steps into the role of usurper. In other words, Congress ignores its
role as a check on the President and assumes a leadership role akin to
negotiating a treaty-an activity clearly forbidden to Congress-when
it dictates specific conditions for relations between foreign entities.
Thus, although the Boland amendment 20' may not violate the legal
limits of the Constitution, because the Constitution appears to set no
defined limits, it is clear that the amendment does violate the spirit
and general principles of the document.
Moreover, the Boland amendment is an example of congressional
ineptitude, which demonstrates why the framers committed foreign
policy preeminence to the Executive. This fact becomes even more
clear when we trace the course of the amendment. First, is it really
the Boland amendment, or is it the Boland amendments, or would
you really let them rise to the dignity of amendments? For example,
in year one aid is allowed as long as it is not used by the CIA to
199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
200. U.S. CONsT. art. II, §§ 2, 3.
201. See, e.g., Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793, 96
Stat. 1830, 1865 (1982). A compilation of the Boland type amendments, and the
accompanying legislative history, was done in the beginning of June, 1987 by the
Congressional Research Service, at the request of Rep. Alexander. See 133 CONG. REC.
H4584-4987 (daily ed. June 15, 1987); see also H.R. REP. No. 433, S. REP. No. 216, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 395-410, 489-99 (1987) (Chapter 26 of the majority report ("The Boland
Amendments and the NSC Staff.") and Chapter 6 of the minority report ("The Boland
Amendments.")).
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overthrow the Sandinistas.2 "2 The next year, aid is permitted as long
as the Department of Defense and the CIA do not engage in a list of
specific activities.2 °3 In year three, aid is allowed with few restrictions
at all.2°1 The following year, aid, either direct or indirect, is forbid-
den.2 °" The next year aid is permitted again, but only if it is humani-
tarian.2 '6  Finally, aid is resumed without conditions. 20 7 Now this
kind of consistency and clarity in foreign policy could only come from
Congress. If all of our foreign affairs were conducted in this manner,
we would probably provoke World War III in a short period of time,
with the entire world fighting us.
In conclusion, the absence of a clear legal demarcation between
congressional and executive authority in foreign affairs indicates that
this constitutional issue will be decided by a lengthy pattern of prac-
tice between the branches. Our attempt to find a general principle
that ought to govern, however, suggests that the President ought to be
left to propose and initiate, and the Congress ought to be employed as
a check on faulty policies. This is what Congress does best. When
Congress presumes to lead and set conditions, however, it ventures to
undertake a mission that it is ill-equipped to handle. Just as we criti-
cize judges for presuming to legislate-a function that I think we all
would agree they are generally ill-equipped to undertake-so should
202. Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat.
1830, 1865 (1982).
203. Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-107, § 101(c), 97
Stat. 735, 736; Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-212, § 775, 97 Stat. 1421, 1452; Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-215, § 108, 97 Stat. 1473, 1475.
204. Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066, 98 Stat.
1837, 1935-37.
205. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83,
§ 722(d), 99 Stat. 190, 254; International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 722(e), 99 Stat. 190, 254; Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal
Year Ending September 30, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-88, § 102(b), 99 Stat. 293, 324-25.
206. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-169, § 105, 99
Stat. 1002, 1003; Further Continuing Appropriations, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-190, § 8050, 99
Stat. 1185, 1211; see also Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-145,
§ 1451, 99 Stat. 583, 760 (Sense of Congress that United States armed forces should not be
introduced into or over Nicaragua.).
207. Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-500, §§ 201-16, 99
Stat. 1783, 2078-81.
Since the delivery of these remarks, this back and forth pattern has continued. See
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-178, § 104, 101 Stat.
1009, 1011 (terms and conditions for aid to Nicaraguan resistance); Department of Defense
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180, § 1405, 99 Stat. 1019,
1179 (Sense of Congress that United States Armed Forces should not be introduced into or
over Nicaragua); Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 8144,
101 Stat. 1329, 1329-89 (prohibiting expenditure of funds by DOD or CIA to Nicaraguan
resistance except in accordance with Pub. L. No. 100-178, § 104, 101 Stat. 1009, 1011).
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we criticize the Congress when it attempts to formulate and execute
foreign policy, a function it is not really equipped to formulate. The
Boland amendments are classic examples of why the framers did not
place foreign affairs into the hands of Congress.
Turning to the War Powers Resolution, similar constitutional
and practical problems present themselves. The Constitution does
not envision that we will stop and file a cloture petition in the Senate
before returning fire, nor does it envision that we will stop and seek a
time agreement for the Senate debate before protecting American
lives and interests. Furthermore, the Constitution clearly does not
envision that we consider a veto override before dodging a torpedo, or
digging a fox hole. And these are only the practical problems. I agree
with Gene Rostow that it is unconstitutional and something that Con-
gress has politically foisted off on Presidents. Quite simply, the War
Powers Resolution does not conform either to reality or to a plain
reading of the Constitution. For constitutional and practical reasons,
I simply do not think it can be upheld.
V. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
SPEAKER: Why did Judge Sofaer and the State Department, in
trying to reinterpret correctly the ABM treaty,2 °s not really refer to
what President Carter did with regard to the Taiwan Relations Act 2°9
in 1979, where he decided that he did not want to abide by the treaty.
PROFESSOR ROSTOW: Since the time President Carter
abrogated the security treaty with Taiwan,2t ° I have objected to his
action on constitutional grounds. I find it hard to imagine that a
treaty ratified with the advice and consent of the Senate, part of the
supreme law of the land, can be abrogated by a President on his own
authority. For example, if a President should suddenly take us out of
NATO, and when we woke up in the morning, we found three or four
of our most fundamental security treaties abrogated without any con-
gressional participation, I would feel that the President acted beyond
his discretion. Some Presidents, nevertheless, have abrogated treaties
208. See remarks of Abraham D. Sofaer in Koh, Nowak, Rees & Sofaer, The Treaty Power,
43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 101, 101-06.
209. Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3316 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986)).
210. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of
China, United States-Taiwan, December 2, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178, 248
U.N.T.S. 213 (entered into force March 3, 1955), terminated January 1, 1980. Article X of the
Treaty provided: "This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either party may terminate
it one year after notice has been given to the other Party." Mutual Defense Treaty Between
the United States of America and the Republic of China, December 2, 1954, United States-
Taiwan, art. X, 6 U.S.T. 433, 437, T.I.A.S. No. 3178, at 5, 248 U.N.T.S. 213, at 216.
[Vol. 43:165
MEANING OF EXECUTIVE POWER
because they found that the other party already had abrogated and
breached the treaty, and therefore, the treaty was in a condition of
breach. This seems to be a permissible part of the President's power
in conducting foreign relations. Also, treaties have been abrogated in
order to recognize another country, which is what President Carter
did in the Taiwan case, when he established diplomatic relations with
the Peoples Republic of China. As an incident to that action, he also
exercised the withdrawal clause of the security treaty with Taiwan.
Constitutionally, that is a defensible position because the President
has an absolute monopoly on the question of recognition.2"
In 1933, when President Roosevelt established diplomatic rela-
tions with the Soviet Union, many agreements were made on the side.
The Supreme Court said that those side agreements were, indeed, part
of the supreme law of the land.212 It is important to note that some of
those opinions have been criticized.
SENATOR HATCH: A perfect illustration is when a President
operates on his own in foreign policy because he concludes that it is
more advantageous to world politics and to our country to have rela-
tions with mainland China than it is to continue the treaty with Tai-
wan. I think, however, we could have maintained our relationship
with Taiwan and still created good relations with mainland China.
With regard to the ABM treaty, I think Judge Sofaer makes an
eloquent case that Sam Nunn is wrong. I also think President Reagan
makes an eloquent case that Sam Nunn is wrong, because after watch-
ing the Russians violate the ABM treaty for years, I now argue for
careful interpretations. It is incongruous that Senator Nunn puts us
into a debatable posture when, literally, we are in the midst of negoti-
ations with the Soviets, who themselves violate all canons of careful
interpretation.
After we recognized mainland China, we experienced a decrease
in good feelings between our country and China. It was only after
Senator Henry Jackson went to China that the Chinese signaled they
211. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C.) (The mutual defense treaty with
Taiwan could not be terminated without advice and consent of Senate or approval of both
Houses of Congress.), rev'd, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.) (Because the President has full
constitutional authority to recognize governments, the President did not exceed authority in
terminating the mutual defense treaty in accordance with termination clause.), vacated and
remanded, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.) (district court directed to dismiss).
212. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). The Supreme Court held that the
Executive had the authority to speak as the "sole organ of government" in negotiating an
agreement settling claims and counterclaims between the United States and Soviet citizens and
entities. Id. at 330. The Court further held that the agreement had the same effect as a treaty,
although it did not require art. II, § 2 advice and consent, so that state policy could not prevail
over the agreement. Id. at 330-32.
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were ready to resume better relations with us. They met with Senator
Jackson, Senator Zorinsky, and myself, as the Republican counterpart
to Jackson, and treated us royally while we were in China. You are,
however, looking at a Senator who amended Carter's Taiwan Rela-
tions Act against the President's will.2" 3 He fought the amendment to
provide elements of protection for the Republic of China. This is
another instance where Congress had to adapt itself politically to the
President's will in foreign policy. We did not adapt completely, how-
ever, because we provided some continuing protection for our long-
standing relationship with the Republic of China, which irritated the
People's Republic. I think it also showed that we did not need the
Taiwan Relations Act. What was needed was for the President to
stand up and express a desire for good relations with mainland China,
in harmony with our long-term relationship with Taiwan. I think the
Chinese would have accepted that accommodation.
PROFESSOR TIGAR: It is hard to get over the fact that the
Constitution divides the treatymaking process between the Senate and
the President. What is being argued here is that the Senate agreed to
the text of the treaty, and yet, apparently was not aware of the mean-
ing that is now being ascribed to it.
Such an argument, which is legitimate, has to rest either on an
interpretation of the text of the Constitution that I really do not see
here, or Senator Hatch's view that somehow the President is more
competent to do this. I would remind the Senator that while the
Boland amendments were being debated and enacted, across town at
1600 Pennsylvania, the North-Poindexter show was being played out,
which was hardly a model of consistency in the executive branch.
SENATOR HATCH: It was a lot more consistent than Con-
gress, I will tell you that.
PROFESSOR ROSTOW: I did not answer your question about
the application of the Taiwan example to the controversy over the
ABM Treaty. It cannot be advanced seriously that the interpretation
of a treaty, which is an international instrument of contract between
213. See Amend. No. 98 and U.P. Amend. No. 44 to S. 245. 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125
CONG. REC. 4611-16, 4836-37 (1979). Amend. No. 98 was withdrawn, 125 CONG. REC. 4616,
but U.P. Amend. No. 44 was approved. 125 CONG. REC. 4836. Senator Hatch's amendments
(1) permitted Taiwan to retain all of its consular offices in the United States, instead of
requiring a substantial reduction, and (2) stated that embargo threats against Taiwan would be
considered of grave threat to the security of the United States. Both were approved on voice
votes. Ultimately, H.R. 2479 was passed in lieu of S. 245. See 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 36. The House bill, however, incorporated most of the Senate provisions.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 96-71, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 36, 95-104. U.P. Amend. No. 44's provisions are codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 3309(b)(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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countries, is decisively determined by what was said, or not said, in
the murky debates on obscure side issues in 1972 on the ratification of
the ABM Treaty.
I think Judge Sofaer is entirely correct on this aspect of the con-
troversy. The interpretation of treaties is the subject of vast volumes,
and it is like the interpretation of other contracts-a matter of what
the parties have decided. If the ratification process is perfunctory, it
is still, nonetheless, a treaty, and the treaty has to be interpreted in
accordance with the normal rules. These rules are that the later inter-
pretation of the treaties should govern over the former. The Presi-
dent, in the first instance, is surely the person to interpret the treaty,
just as he must interpret any other law when he enforces it. Congress
can always overrule that construction by passing a statute inconsis-
tent with the President's interpretation. According to our law, the
later statement of the legislative intent prevails.
In the controversy about the ABM Treaty, there really is no
doubt about the facts. In the negotiations, the Russians would not
agree that the treaty should cover future technologies. They said:
"You do not know what the new technologies are going to do, and we
do not know what they are going to do. So let us agree to leave them
out." That is what they thought they were doing in Agreed Statement
D.214 The other interpretation, the so-called "narrow" interpretation,
is a perfectly plausible legal theory, except that it does not correspond
to the facts of the negotiations, and it does not explain why Agreed
Statement D is there at all.
SPEAKER: In light of the President's responsibility to faithfully
execute the laws, what is the proper and responsible way for the Presi-
dent to initiate a challenge to the War Powers Resolution, or any act
that he feels is unconstitutional?
MR. COOPER: Well, the restrictions on justiciability make that
a very difficult question to answer. The President cannot file a lawsuit
against Congress to determine his rights under the War Powers Reso-
lution. Obviously, on the other hand, he cannot fail to perform his
constitutional obligations to the American people as the Chief Execu-
tive, the Commander-in-Chief, and the chief organ of our relations
with foreign countries. It is really a very difficult position for any
President. Any time there is a statute on the books that usurps the
President's authorities, he simply cannot be bound by it.
PROFESSOR ROSTOW: Let me save the Assistant Attorney
General from barratry and maintenance. He cannot admit to engag-
214. Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States-USSR,
Agreed Interpretation D, 23 U.S.T. 3435, 3456, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 21.
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ing in any such practices, but of course, he can and should organize a
test suit, a practice used since the beginning of time. The President,
however, should not make the mistake that Andrew Johnson made in
testing the constitutionality of the Tenure of Office Act, which was
the basis of his impeachment.2"5 That was a terrible mistake. Luckily
for him and for the Constitution, he prevailed.
The President has to disobey the Act in order to present a justici-
able case, or he can follow the strange reasoning of Sierra Club v.
Morton,2 16 or Board of Education v. Allen. 2 17 Because the Supreme
Court was so sympathetic to the law students who brought the Sierra
litigation, I suggest that some of you go out and start a little litigation
on that subject.
SPEAKER: But that is a passive response, where he has to
defend. I am talking about-
PROFESSOR ROSTOW: Well, he doesn't have to defend the
constitutionality in that case.
SPEAKER: But that subjects him to the possibility of the Ten-
ure of Office Act and impeachment if the political tensions get-
PROFESSOR ROSTOW: I suggest powerful maintenance, that
is all.
SENATOR HATCH: It is a political problem for the President.
No one would fail to recognize that. He knows that if the climate is
not right in this country for his refusal to comply with the War Pow-
ers Resolution, then he is going to pay a heavy political price for it.
He also knows that generally--especially in the years since the Viet-
nam War-it is very difficult to get involved in any form of conflict
without having whole segments of our society up in arms over it.
The only practical way that he can test it is to refuse to comply.
The President is basically refusing to comply with it in the Persian
Gulf matter, but Congress really has not tested him that much on it.
I suspect that he would be sued at that point in a very important test
215. See generally D. DEWITT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON
(1903) (discussion of the circumstances leading to the Tenure of Office Act, President Andrew
Johnson's veto and later refusal to comply with the provisions of the act, and his subsequent
impeachment).
216. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). The Supreme Court held that a non-economic injury confers
standing to challenge an agency action under 5 U.S.C. § 702, but that the mere allegation of a
"special interest" in the action is insufficient. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739-40. A plaintiff must
allege facts showing injury to himself before arguing the public interest in support of his claim.
Id. at 735.
217. 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (A penalty of expulsion from the board or reduction in state
funding of a school district provided a personal stake sufficient for local school board members
to challenge, on first amendment grounds, a statute permitting the free provision of textbooks
to parochial students.).
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case. I am not sure, however, that the Supreme Court is going to
resolve it in the end.
MR. COOPER: It is not accurate to say the President has failed
to comply with the War Powers Resolution with respect to Persian
Gulf matters. In every incident that might even arguably have
required a report, a report satisfying those requirements has been
filed. By the same token, however, he obviously is continuing to pur-
sue a policy that he believes, in his capacity as the Chief Executive,
Commander-in-Chief, and principal organ for foreign relations in this
country, is in the best interest of the American people.
SPEAKER: The reason I asked the question is because I am
inviting the Congress, and all the scholars and lawyers, to be open to
the possibility of creating some sort of injunctive relief, or having leg-
islation that will be able to test this, that the President initiate some
sort of affirmative move so he is not caught in this tension where he-
MR. COOPER: There is another problem with what we are
suggesting here and that is-
SPEAKER: -because I think ignoring the law is not-
PROFESSOR TIGAR: Assistant Attorney General Cooper is
in a difficult position. He is like the old boy who said, "Well, I don't
know about that issue. I haven't been retained yet." No one on this
panel believes that the President acts in a rule freeway, right? That is
to say, we are all talking about how you enforce the rules. While I
yield to no one in my belief that the courts have the power to resolve
disputes that involve private and even public rights, I would like to
suggest something else that comes out of twenty years of being a trial
lawyer. If the President and the Congress get to fussing with each
other about it, they could settle it short of litigation. There is nothing
wrong with that, and the constitutional system ought to provide for
that. Indeed, it is a preferred way in the law life of the nation, as it is
in the private relations of individuals.
A preemptive suit of the kind you are talking, however, obvi-
ously raises all of the justiciability difficulties trumped or doubled
because the event has not yet happened. The particular way that the
President regards his conduct as unreasonably restrained has not been
spelled out by what he did.
Maybe you are back to Marbury v. Madison?218 Judge Marbury,
in essence, said, "You know, Adams told me I could be a judge, and
the son of a gun won't give me my commission!" Chief Justice Mar-
shall, while he said that the statute is unconstitutional, also went out
218. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1804).
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of his way to tell Thomas Jefferson that he ought to have shaped
up.2 9 That is the original intent answer to your question.
PROFESSOR ROSTOW: What Professor Tigar says is per-
fectly correct, of course, except that at the present moment, we have
an opportunity where there could be a live plaintiff with a real case.
For example, the mother or widow of a soldier or sailor who was
killed could bring an action as an executor.
MR. COOPER: That assumes that the political question doc-
trine does not apply to the questions that must be litigated.
SPEAKER: I would like to ask Senator Hatch if he feels that the
views he expressed are going to get a fair play in the pending commit-
tee report which is due out soon?22°
SENATOR HATCH: I have read most of the report on both
sides, the majority and the minority. The majority does try to justify
the Boland amendments. 221  The minority, I think, rips them to
shreds,222 but you will have to make up your own mind. I happen to
have been a subscriber to the minority report, and I felt that the
majority report was biased in its approach. It misstated and distorted
some of the facts. It was too political, and frankly, some of the con-
clusions they reached were not very good. Even from a slanted per-
spective, however, the majority report admits there was no venality in
this affair.223 There is a real question whether there was real criminal
intent to violate any statutes.
219. Id. at 154-6 1 (describing the appointment power of the President, and at what point
executive discretion ends and ministerial duty begins).
220. H.R. REP. No. 433, S. REP. No. 216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (reported
November 13, 1987, ordered to be printed November 17, 1987).
221. See id. at 395-407.
222. See id. at 489-500.
223. See id. at 7, 331-59, 417-20.
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